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Abstract
Global health governance is in many ways proving more innovative and resilient than other sectors in global governance. In order
to understand the mechanisms that have made these developments possible, this article draws on the concept of gridlock, as well
as on the additional theoretical strands of metagovernance and adaptive governance, to conceptualize how global health gover-
nance has been able to adapt despite increasingly difﬁcult conditions in the multilateral order. The remarkable degree of innova-
tion that characterizes global health governance is the result of two interrelated conditions. First, developments that are normally
associated with gridlock in multilateral cooperation, such as institutional fragmentation and growing multipolarity, have trans-
formed, rather than gridlocked, global health governance. Second, global health actors have often been able to harness the oppor-
tunities offered by three important pathways of change, namely: (1) a signiﬁcant degree of organizational learning and active
feedback loops between epistemic and practice communities; (2) a highly polycentric system of governance; and (3) the increased
role of political leadership as a catalyst for governance innovation. These trends are discussed in the context of three case studies
of signiﬁcant political, social and health relevance, namely HIV/AIDS, the 2014 Ebola outbreak and antimicrobial resistance.
Policy Implications
• The WHO should not seek to separate its normative and technical function from its convening and leadership function in
order to re-assert its authority as the core institution of global health governance.
• The use of effective interorganizational coordination mechanisms need to be expanded, with emphasis on areas such as
environmental health and non-communicable diseases, or strengthened when already in place (such as in AMR), given
that most current and emerging health challenges now require action beyond the health sector.
• Raising the political proﬁle of health challenges requires the consideration of the conditions under which doing so might
foster signiﬁcant progress. It is necessary to form inclusive alliances which coalesce around common goals and norms and
bring together different types of actors.
• The funding strategies of actors including multilateral development banks and private foundations must increasingly shift
from vertical disease programmes to health system strengthening objectives, including universal health coverage and
greater attention to the determinants of health.
• International efforts aimed at generating buy-in by developing country actors on global health initiatives will have to be
complemented by a stronger emphasis on using political leadership to create ownership at the domestic level, ﬁlling the
persistent implementation and capacity gap that many countries still face.
The complex interdependence and interconnected crises
that characterize the current stage of globalization are often
perceived to have outgrown the capacity of the
international community to further engage in multilateral
cooperation to supply global public goods including ﬁnan-
cial stability, climate change mitigation, security and the
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integrity of the biosphere (Goldin, 2013; Hale et al., 2013a;
Lamy and Goldin, 2014). Not only do the multilateral institu-
tions established after World War II seem increasingly
unable to address problems of collective action that cross
national boundaries, this deﬁcit is reinforced by a more sys-
temic crisis (if not outright decline) of the international lib-
eral order, punctuated by the parallel rise of nationalistic
and protectionist tendencies in many countries (Ikenberry,
2018).
As recently discussed by Hale et al. (2017), however, the
effectiveness of global governance presents stark variations
across sectors and even at the level of single institutions
or regimes within them. Global health governance, in par-
ticular, has undergone a radical transformation over the
last three decades (Hoffman et al., 2015; Schaferhoff et al.,
2015), while during the same period some other areas of
global governance were suffering from severe instances of
stalemate and inaction (Hale et al., 2013b).1 Beginning in
the 1990s, available funding for global health (IHME, 2018)
and the number of global health actors (Hoffman et al.,
2015) both started to increase exponentially, resulting in
major shifts in the approach to global health, in the archi-
tecture of the global health system (Hoffman et al., 2015;
Youde 2014) and in its mechanisms and objectives
(Schaferhoff et al., 2015). One consequence was signiﬁcant
achievements across several regions and issue areas, such
as the global fall of maternal and child mortality (UN,
2015), increased access to anti-retroviral therapy, scaled-up
malaria interventions in Africa (UN, 2015) and continued
progress towards the eradication of polyomielitis (WHO,
2015).
Moreover, this expansion of global health governance
occurred at a time of signiﬁcant changes in the global
political landscape, effectively spelling a new age of global
health. At present, we can see several trends at work. First,
high-income countries remain the principal funders of the
major global health organizations and initiatives (Dieleman
et al., 2016), but political trends against foreign aid in
many of these countries, and particularly in the United
States, have resulted in a growing uncertainty about the
future of global health ﬁnancing (Donor Tracker, 2018;
Kates et al., 2018; Van Hise, 2017). Second and in parallel,
the political inﬂuence and global health expenditure of ris-
ing middle income powers including China, India, Brazil,
South Africa and Russia have progressively grown (Gautier
et al., 2014; Harmer and Buse, 2014; Jakovljevic et al.,
2017), highlighting a gradual but steady shift in the distri-
bution of powers in global health governance. Third, the
adoption, in September 2015, of the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (SDGs) has ushered in a vision of global health
governance which moves away from a vertical focus on
speciﬁc diseases and towards a broader emphasis on
health systems and a more holistic vision of health and
well-being (Buse and Hawkes, 2015). Lastly, the 2017 elec-
tion of Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus as the World Health
Organization’s (WHO) new Director-General demonstrated a
stronger emphasis, on the part of the organization, on the
exercise of political leadership as a means of maintaining
global health high on the political agenda of countries
(Kickbusch, 2017).
The expansion and politicization of global health gover-
nance suggest that this sector has been more innovative
and resilient than usually assumed for global governance as
a whole. However, we still have an insufﬁcient understand-
ing of the speciﬁc features and causal mechanisms that
have made it possible for the global health system to adapt,
learn and respond to the changing conditions of the multi-
lateral order. Improving such understanding would not only
facilitate mutual learning and comparison of promising
pathways of change across sectors, but also, prospectively,
help identify the means through which global health gover-
nance can remain ﬁt for purpose in an era of rapid
economic, social, technological and environmental transfor-
mations. Doing so, in turn, would require situating global
health governance debates in a broader historical and insti-
tutional context and particularly applying more solid foun-
dations drawn from international relations theory to its
study. As noted by Lee and Kamradt-Scott (2014), the extent
to which theory and practice have been able to inform each
other in global health governance literature has generally
been limited. More recently, this has resulted in either: (1) a
narrow focus on speciﬁc institutional arrangements, issue
areas, population groups and geographic regions (Clinton
and Sridhar, 2017; Crawford et al., 2017; Gostin et al., 2015;
Nikogosian and Kickbusch, 2016); or (2) discussions with a
strong conceptual and sometimes prescriptive focus (Ben-
nett et al., 2017; Frenk and Moon, 2013; Mackey, 2016;
Smith and Lee, 2017).
To bridge this gap, this article conducts a theoretically
grounded analysis of the pathways to increasingly difﬁcult
cooperation and change that have characterized global
health governance in the past three decades, as well as the
interactions between them. First, the article draws on the
concept of gridlock (Hale et al., 2013a, 2017) and investi-
gates the dynamics of global health governance in order to
understand how pathways to gridlock apply in this ﬁeld.
Second, the article considers additional strands of theory,
particularly those of metagovernance (Holzscheiter, 2014;
Meuleman, 2008) and adaptive governance (Dietz et al.,
2003; : Chafﬁn et al., 2014) and evaluates how this sector of
global governance has confronted underlying conditions of
gridlock in the multilateral order. In order to do so, the arti-
cle relies on three case studies of signiﬁcant political, social
and health relevance which also exemplify different types of
health threats, namely HIV/AIDS, the 2014 Ebola outbreak in
Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone and antimicrobial resistance
(AMR).
The article is structured as follows: Section 1 describes the
research approach and methodology, Sections 2 and 3 pre-
sent and discuss the main ﬁndings, focusing on the main
pathways to cooperation that we have uncovered in the
recent evolution of global health governance (section 2) as
well as on governance innovations and pathways of change
(section 3).2 Finally, section 4 concludes by highlighting the
implications of our analysis for the future development of
global health governance.
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1. Research approach and methods
This research adopts a qualitative, mixed-method approach
organized around the structured, focused comparison of
three case studies (George and Bennet, 2005). The HIV/
AIDS pandemic, in the light of its complex history, as well
as due to its pivotal role in transforming public health into
a truly global endeavor (Brandt, 2013; Gostin, 2014), was
selected as the example of a protracted health threat. By
contrast, the 2014 Ebola outbreak represents a contempo-
rary acute health crisis, whose toll in terms of human lives
and other social and economic impacts (Elston et al., 2017)
is often taken as the clearest indication of a persisting lack
of capacities for emergency preparedness and response in
global health (Gostin and Friedman, 2014). Lastly, despite
the fact that concerns about drug resistance can be traced
back to the very advent of antibiotics, only in recent years
have global health governance initiatives on AMRcome into
greater prominence. As a consequence, AMR is chosen
here as a case study for ‘future’ health threats, with the
direct and indirect impacts associated with soaring rates of
resistance projected to increase progressively over the next
few decades (The Review on Antimicrobial Resistance,
2014).
The research took each case study as a starting point
for analysis, tracking and tracing the governance of each
area over time through a scoping and mapping of the pol-
icy and political landscape that constitute their respective
governance environments. Following from this, the applica-
bility of pathways to and beyond gridlock in relation to
global health in general, and the selected case studies in
particular, was explored through desk research (document
review and content analysis) and interviews (semi-struc-
tured). The following data sources were used to develop
the research ﬁndings:
• N = 40 in-depth (semi-structured) interviews with key
stakeholders in global health governance were selected
according to the seniority of their positions and direct
involvement in the governance history of the three case
studies. The sample was initially developed by extensive
mapping of the key actors involved in each case study,
trying to ensure a balanced representation between those
headquartered in Geneva and those based elsewhere.
Snowballing was then used to replace interviewees who
became unavailable or to expand the sample whenever a
speciﬁc individual was recommended during the course
of an interview. The interviewees included current or for-
mer directors, assistant directors-general, deputy direc-
tors-general and members of the executive board of the
WHO (n = 9); directors and senior representatives of
international global health NGOs (n = 7); directors and
senior representatives of international health organiza-
tions other than the WHO (n = 6); health attaches/coun-
selors at the permanent missions of UN member States in
Geneva (n = 5); directors or senior researchers at aca-
demic institutions and other global health research orga-
nizations (n = 5); senior US government ofﬁcials (n = 3);
senior European Commission ofﬁcials (n = 2); members of
the leadership team of health-focused private foundations
(n = 2); and a senior manager for a pharmaceutical and
life sciences company (n = 1) [see Figure 1]. Among the
interviews, 11 focused generally on global health gover-
nance, 10 were concerned with HIV/AIDS, 12 with AMR
and eight discussed the 2014 Ebola outbreak.3 The inter-
views were conducted in person for health attaches and
representatives of organizations headquartered in Geneva
or via web conferencing software for interviewees based
in other countries between October 2016 and July 2017.
• Primary documents produced by the governing bodies of
selected institutions, including (but not limited to), the
Figure 1. Main institutional afﬁliation (current or former) of the interviewees. Only one institutional afﬁliation in considered for each inter-
viewee, namely the most relevant to the case study about which the individual was interviewed.
*The category deﬁned as ‘International health organizations (non-WHO)’ speciﬁcally includes GAVI Alliance, GFATM, UNAIDS, Unitaid.
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World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations
Joint Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the Global Fund
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), Unitaid,
the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and the G7/G20. The
documents were collected through a comprehensive
search conducted in the resource databases of the
respective institutions.
A qualitative content analysis of the interviews and pri-
mary texts was conducted, focusing on three main themes:
(1) key governance challenges for each case study; (2) grid-
lock and nongridlock explanations for those challenges; and
(3) pathways of innovation and learning, with a focus on the
innovative and adaptive features of global health gover-
nance that might have facilitated the process of overcoming
underlying conditions of gridlock. The primary data were
coded with the aid of NVivo Software, using a mix of prede-
termined and emergent codes (n = 34 codes in total) to
facilitate a systemic qualitative content analysis and develop
a better understanding of the relevant insights, patterns and
casual mechanisms. We identiﬁed a set of relevant codes for
each research question and visualized coding density along-
side these codes. We then explored the codes with the
highest density to uncover overarching and repetitive
themes in the responses and primary texts and accordingly
developed a set of ﬁndings. Triangulation was conducted by
exploring coding densities for the in-depth interviews and
the primary texts side-by-side, in order to make sure that
the relevant interview responses were not outliers. In addi-
tion, relevant responses from interviews focused on the case
studies were compared with responses from general inter-
views on global health governance, to allow generalization
of ﬁndings.
In the following sections, the occurrence of a certain
theme across interviews related to a single case study is
indicated as a percentage of responses, whereas the level of
agreement among the interviewees overall is presented
through the use of four summary terms, indicating the total
number of interviews in which a theme is discussed: ‘very
strong’ (30 to 40 interviews), ‘strong’ (20–30 interviews),
‘medium’ (10 to 20 interviews) and ‘limited’ (0 to 10 inter-
views). It should be noted that the ﬁndings presented here
are concerned with the dynamics of global health gover-
nance as seen from the perspective of global stakeholders,
rather than regional and local ones. This is important,
because pathways to gridlock and change involve structural
trends and their implications for global health governance
may vary depending on the level at which these processes
are observed and studied.
2. A changing structural context: pathways to
gridlock and their implications for global health
governance
In line with our analytical framework, the ﬁrst major theme
explored in this article concerns in the extent to which the
pathways to gridlock described by Hale et al. (2013a,
2013b) apply to the recent governance history of our case
studies and of global health more generally. In developing
their theory of gridlock, which problematizes the growing
inability of countries to address transnational policy prob-
lems, Hale et al. have particularly pointed to four interacting
trends: increasing multipolarity, more complex (harder)
problems, institutional inertia and fragmentation. Kickbusch
and Reddy (2015) and Brown and Held (2017) have recently
made initial attempts at describing the presence of such
trends in global health governance. According to these
authors,
• increasing multipolarity can be associated with the rise
of middle income countries as new powerful actors in
global governance, which in global health has resulted in
the decline of the traditional distinction between donor
and aid-recipient countries and in the subsequent chal-
lenge of negotiating a consensus among a wider range
of actors advancing different world views and political
interests;
• the notion of harder problems captures the greater scope
and complexity of health challenges in an era character-
ized by the accelerating forces of globalization and partic-
ularly by the transboundary ﬂows of people and
information, consumption and production of goods and
services, as well as negative environmental externalities;
• institutional inertia refers in particular to the WHO and to
the different forms of path-dependence that have led
many to question its role in the global health system,
including lack of decisive leadership, shifting interests of
member states, progressive reduction of the proportion
of assessed contributions within its budget and dysfunc-
tional policy processes;
• fragmentation, ﬁnally, alludes to the negative effects of
an increasingly dense institutional ecosystem that has for
many years failed to create effective coordinating mecha-
nisms, leading to increased transaction costs, greater
competition for resources and the continuing inﬂuence of
powerful countries and actors on the global health
agenda.4
Prima facie, our ﬁndings conﬁrm the idea that global health
governance has been inevitably affected by the underlying
forces of globalization and complex interdependence
described in gridlock theory. In fact, even when not explic-
itly associating themselves with gridlock terminology, all
interviewees identiﬁed pathways to increasingly difﬁcult
cooperation and stalemate in global health governance that
could be described as pathways to gridlock. However, the
ﬁndings also provide two important additional considera-
tions. First, not all pathways to gridlock have played the
same role in the evolution of global health governance. Of
these, the interviewees put a relative emphasis on trends of
growing multipolarity and fragmentation (see Table 1), high-
lighting a rapidly changing structural context of global
health characterized by both: (1) a shifting distribution of
power and (2) the rise of polycentric, networked forms of
governance. Second, our ﬁndings suggest that these path-
ways have presented both challenges and opportunities for
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global health governance and that under certain conditions
they have led to the adaptive responses and innovations
that will be discussed in Section 3. The present section par-
ticularly turns to the multifacted role played by growing
multipolarity and fragmentation in changing the structural
context of global health governance.
The challenges and opportunities of emerging
multipolarity in global health
Throughout our interviews, it was often noted that shifting
geopolitical rivalries and domestic political forces have
always inﬂuenced consensus building within multilateral
institutions (strong agreement) and even more so for organi-
zations, like the WHO, that have remained strongly depen-
dent on their particular federal design (Hanrieder, 2015).
Similarly, the role of WHO member states in contributing to
the organization’s long-standing funding and prioritization
problems is well accepted (strong agreement) and so is the
fact that the emergence of powerful non-state actors, such
as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF), has cre-
ated new forms of complex and ideational polarity that mul-
tilateral institutions now have to navigate (medium
agreement).5 What is particularly interesting, in this context,
is that the rapidly shifting distribution of powers in global
governance, described elsewhere as ‘the rise of the rest’
(Zakaria, 2008), is also altering fundamentally the political
landscape and dynamics of global health. As will be
explained below, this is particularly evident for the HIV/AIDS
and AMR case studies, whereas less importance was
attached to this theme in the interviews discussing the 2014
Ebola outbreak.6
On a more descriptive level, many instances of growing
multipolarity are visible in global health, ranging from the
emergence of strong pharmaceutical and other global
health industries in middle income countries (Ross, 2013) to
examples of South-South cooperation in the forms of strate-
gic investments or development assistance for health (DAH)
(Cabral et al., 2014; Kickbusch, 2016). But what exactly is the
signiﬁcance of these trends?
On the one hand, the article ﬁnds that growing multipo-
larity can indeed have a negative impact on international
cooperation in health by compounding the traditional difﬁ-
culties of multilateral decision-making. As their political clout
grows, middle income countries yield greater inﬂuence in
governance processes, especially in terms of protecting their
nascent industries or powerful sectors. This was especially
visible in the AMR case study. Ninety-two percent of all AMR
interviews, for example, highlighted Brazil’s concerns with
the protection of domestic agri-business in the negotiations
of the WHO Global Action Plan on AMR and, more recently,
of the WHO Global Stewardship and Development Frame-
work, with 17% also emphasizing how the issue of produc-
tion of, access to and patenting of antimicrobial medicines
is being used by middle income countries including China
and India as a leverage for defending or expanding ﬂexibili-
ties in the global intellectual property (IP) regime:
Multilateral politics is a major limitation [on AMR]
because there is a need to take care of the inter-
ests of your own emerging pharma sector [. . .]
there is a danger of progress being locked down
because it is tied to different multilateral political
agendas from various countries in the South and to
the access issue especially and patent issues
(Health attache/counselor 1, interview conducted
on 7 November 2016).
On the other hand, growing multipolarity has also
resulted in the emergence of new country champions (med-
ium agreement), whose diverse range of interest has in turn
led to more inclusive approaches to health issues and ulti-
mately driven progress in many areas of global health. With
respect to AMR, 42% of the interviewees pointed to the
steps taken on the domestic front by countries including
China, India and Thailand to promote the smart use of
antimicrobials.7 Even more important, however, has been
Table 1. Coding density in the qualitative interviews for the four pathways to gridlock identiﬁed by Hale et al. (2013a,b). Coding density
is highest for the pathways of growing multipolarity and fragmentation, which were also discussed in the highest number of interviews,
indicating very strong agreement on the inﬂuence that they have played in the evolution of global health governance.
Pathways to gridlock
Interviews coded
for (HIV/AIDS)
Interviews coded
for (Ebola)
Interviews coded
for (AMR)
Interviews coded
for (General)
Interviews coded
for (TOTAL)*
Coding references
(TOTAL)
Growing multipolarity 8/10 3/8 10/12 11/11 31/41 125
Fragmentation 10/10 8/8 10/12 11/11 39/41 137
Institutional inertia 7/10 5/8 4/12 6/11 24/41 78
Harder problems 6/10 5/8 9/12 7/11 27/41 74
Note * As noted above, we formally conducted 40 interviews, but the number used here is 41, because one interviewee responded to questions
relating to both Ebola and AMR. Despite being discussed in a substantial number of interviews, the pathways of harder problems and institu-
tional inertia were more contested. On the one hand, the growing complexity of health problems was generally described as the background
and underlying condition against which all global health governance processes should now be understood, rather than as an inevitable driver
of gridlock across our case studies (strong agreement). On the other, institutional inertia was essentially attributed to certain aspects of the
response of the WHO to the HIV/AIDS and Ebola case studies in particular (medium agreement), making it difﬁcult to generalize it as an over-
arching pathway of global health governance.
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the role of Global South countries in the governance history
of HIV/AIDS. In this context, two fundamental developments
stand out. First, the leadership of countries including Brazil,
India, South Africa and Thailand in the late 1990s, as well as
that of civil society groups stemming from those countries,
are widely considered to have acted as driving forces in
shifting the emphasis of the response towards the develop-
ment of generics and/or the establishment of access to
medicines and treatment as priorities over prevention,
prompting signiﬁcant innovation on issues such as differen-
tial pricing and compulsory licensing (60% of HIV/AIDS inter-
views). Second and as a consequence, this leadership
resulted in the emergence of instances of South-South
cooperation (50% of interviews) in the manufacturing of and
equitable access to anti-retrovirals (ARVs), although these
projects played a variable role in actually meeting the need
for generic drug supply for HIV/AIDS.8 These trends, it
should be noted, are certainly reﬂective of the wider shifts
towards multipolarity which characterize global governance
and there is little sign that they will slow down. As high-
lighted by two interviewees, the priorities of middle income
countries are starting to be reﬂected in their role as aid
donors in global health, not just as aid recipients.9 In addi-
tion, from a broader perspective, there is ample evidence
that South-South cooperation on health issues is going to
increase, as demonstrated by China’s announcement of a
health cooperation plan for Africa (Sun, 2015), the creation
of a new Chinese development agency, as well as by the
recent pledge of US$60 billion in aid and loans to the conti-
nent (Spies, 2018). Overall, the notion of South-South coop-
eration itself might be losing its relevance, as the
contribution of middle income countries becomes a compar-
atively larger part of global health ﬁnancing and assumes
the form of strategic investments with growing geopolitical
implications (Uretsky et al., 2018).
Fragmentation of global health actors and venues:
solution or problem?
Fragmentation as deﬁned by Hale et al. (2013b) refers to
the phenomenon of institutional density and complexity
which can arise as a consequence of the exponential rise in
the number of actors and venues engaging in a given sector
of governance. According to these authors, institutional frag-
mentation results in increased transaction costs, redundancy,
forms of forum shopping and a disaggregation of resources
and political will. In global health, the proliferation of a new
and diverse set of actors and venues over the last three
decades is well documented (Cooper, 2013; Hoffman et al.,
2015) and several parallel explanations are given for this
trend in our interviews.
First, and consistent with an established theme in the lit-
erature,10 the proliferation of global health institutions has
often been considered a positive phenomenon and a way
to mitigate what in the 1990s started to be widely perceived
as inertia, lack of capacity or even complete gridlock within
the WHO, particularly in the context of the HIV/AIDS case
studies (80% of the interviews). In HIV/AIDS, this is high-
lighted by the 1996 creation of the Joint UN Programme on
HIV/AIDS, as well as of those of GAVI Alliance in 2000 and
the GFATM in 2002. As put by one of the interviewees:
One of the reasons that there has been an emer-
gence of new governance structures, whether it’s
UNAIDS, whether it’s the Global Fund, GAVI, or
whether it’s the product development partnership
model, is that those are innovations to overcome
the gridlock of original governance structures. The
original governance structures of the global health
community are becoming more and more obsolete
(Member of the executive leadership team of a pri-
vate foundation, 29 March 2017).
Second, with respect to global health governance more gen-
erally, a number of interviews noted the role played by the
political preferences of WHO member states (limited agree-
ment), describing proliferation as partly driven by a con-
scious strategy by traditional donor countries in the West to
limit and weaken the mandate of the WHO, retain greater
control of global health ﬁnance and build vertical, issue-
focused ‘alliances of the willing’ (Kickbusch and Reddy,
2015, p. 839). Third, in all three case studies, interviewees
pointed to a more neutral aspect of fragmentation, consist-
ing in the growing awareness about the inherent multidi-
mensionality of health challenges and the subsequent
expansion of global health as a sector of governance (60%
of the interviews for HIV/AIDS, 63% for Ebola, 75% for AMR).
Fragmentation in HIV/AIDS governance, for example, was
already visible from the late 1980s, as UN agencies and pro-
grammes with different mandates became involved in the
international response11 in recognition of an epidemic
which did not just come from a virus, but also from ‘pat-
terns of development, poverty and gender’ (Chan, 2015,
p. 134). With respect to AMR, similarly, fragmentation
involves inevitable overlaps between institutions including
WHO, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO), the World Organization for Animal Health
(OIE), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank
and UNICEF, as well as high-level political fora (especially
the UN General Assembly, the G7 and the G20) and non-
state actors ranging from consumer groups, to product
development partnerships (PDPs) and to private companies
in different sectors. Finally, in the case of Ebola, the super-
imposition of the outbreak on complex humanitarian crises
with political and security dimensions also created the chal-
lenge of mobilizing political commitment and resources
through different venues (e.g. G7, G20 and the Global
Health Security Agenda), leading to improved coordination
between UN agencies, governments and other non-state
actors and linking infectious disease responders with the
broader humanitarian and development community.
As part of the governance history of our three case stud-
ies, fragmentation has sometimes led to increased competi-
tion and transaction costs,12 created inconsistencies in
governance processes,13 favored vertical health silos against
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a more holistic focus on health system strengthening,14 and
made inter-organizational coordination and convergence
more difﬁcult.15 These critiques are in line with a vast litera-
ture on global health governance (see, inter alia, Gostin
et al., 2010; Swanson et al., 2015 and Brown and Held,
2017). At the same time, however, fragmentation has argu-
ably played a central role in the mainstreaming of health in
the global political agenda over the last three decades and
particularly since 2000 in response to the critical driver of
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Marten, 2018).
Moreover, as previously mentioned, fragmentation can in
itself be seen as a response to challenges including inertia
in the multilateral system and the harder nature of health
problems.
First, the creation of new institutions and governance
arrangements, including public-private partnerships, product
development partnerships, funding mechanisms and bilat-
eral initiatives, has been described as an example of gover-
nance innovation that can confront institutional path
dependencies, shifting priorities of countries, rapid eco-
nomic, social and political changes and donor complacency
(medium agreement). Second, it was also emphasized (med-
ium agreement) that having pluralistic responses to complex
issues that no single institution can have the capacity or
mandate to deal with is necessary to advance progress:
Already at the conceptual level it’s clear that AMR
is not an issue you can solve within the UN system.
The UN system can solve the normative side, but
medicines have to be developed, regulatory sys-
tems have to be built, there has to be a commit-
ment to them and then such commitment has to
be monitored and followed up [. . .] it’s a huge pro-
cess and the UN can deliver the normative side,
but they cannot deliver the ﬁnancing and the polit-
ical will that is going to require. And the industry
has to be part of it’ (Health attache/counselor 1, 7
November 2016).
The participation of civil society in HIV/AIDS gover-
nance has helped us work pragmatically on the
basis of local conditions and needs. It has helped
us address issues critical to an effective AIDS
response but which are often deemed politically
sensitive by many governments’ (Senior representa-
tive of an international health organization, 12 July
2017).
Third, while sometimes criticized as a symptom of fragmen-
tation, the proliferation of venues in which global health
issues are prioritized, discussed and negotiated (e.g. UNGA,
G8/G7 and, more recently, the G20 and BRICS fora) is also
recognized as a catalyst for creating political momentum
and facilitating the transition of a health issue to the highest
level of political consideration, particularly when such
venues lead groups of diverse actors to coalesce under a set
of common goals or norms (medium agreement).16 Here,
inclusiveness with respect to civil society has been identiﬁed
in our interviews as a critical element for success, as shown
in the governance history of HIV/AIDS with the large-scale
mobilization of civil society movements focusing on equita-
ble access to treatment (50% of the interviewees), in that of
AMR through the emergence of CSOs and consumer unions
advocating against the use of antibiotics as growth promot-
ers in agriculture (25% of the interviewees) and in Ebola
with respect to the catalytic role played by Medecins sans
Frontieres in pushing countries and the WHO to step up
their response in the early phases of the outbreak (50% of
the interviewees).
Lastly, precisely because it inevitably led to inefﬁciencies
and lack of coordination in the ﬁrst place, fragmentation
itself acted as a driver of change, creating a constant
demand and space for governance innovations, inter-organi-
zational convergence, effective exercise of stewardship and
stronger political leadership. As we argue in section 3, this
dynamic is made possible in global health because of the
highly self-reﬂexive nature of the global health community.
Holzscheiter (2014) has highlighted the contested nature of
the inter-organizational convergence narrative in global
health, proposing that some of these efforts end up adding
complexity, rather than reducing it (‘hypercollective action’).
Although this might possibly be true, our ﬁndings suggest
that practitioners still tend to evaluate the effectiveness of
global health governance in terms of improved health out-
comes, rather than on a perfect internal coherence of the
system that seems neither achievable nor necessarily desir-
able (strong agreement). As put by a senior representative of
an international health organization in Geneva,
governance starts and ends with the individual
human person [. . .] This is why the process of gov-
erning must always aim at generating concrete
results that beneﬁt the people on the ground. If we
are not generating meaningful change in people’s
lives, then we are failing (Senior representative of
an international health organization, interviewed on
12 July 2017).
3. Innovation and pathways of change in global
health governance
The changing structural context of global health, which we
describe in the previous section, provides an essential
gateway against which to understand the evolution of this
sector of global governance. Growing multipolarity and
institutional fragmentation are trends that would widely be
considered as obstacles to effective collective action and
yet they arguably play a role in stimulating governance
innovation and building adaptive capacity in the global
health system. In this section, we focus on the role of
speciﬁc ‘pathways of change’ in counteracting the negative
implications of pathways to gridlock and harnessing the
opportunities arising from them. With this term, we
broadly refer to features that are observable in the current
phase of global health governance and that, according to
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our ﬁndings, have contributed (and might potentially con-
tinue to contribute) to improved governance processes and
outcomes across the three case studies. In a similar vein,
Brown and Held (2017) have spoken of pathways through
and beyond gridlock to highlight how the presence of
underlying trends towards gridlock does not necessarily
prevent (and, under certain conditions, might even pro-
mote) the emergence of more robust and effective global
governance regimes.
In particular, we emphasize three characteristics that are
well known in adaptive governance scholarship, but still rel-
atively unexplored in the context of global health gover-
nance (see, however, Hill, 2011): (1) the presence of learning
processes and feedback loops between epistemic and prac-
tice communities; (2) the capacity to reap the beneﬁts of
highly polycentric system of governance; and (3) the
increased role of political leadership as a catalyst for gover-
nance innovation.
The role of learning processes in governance innovation
The transformation of global health governance over the
past three decades demonstrates that governance innova-
tions in this sector are by no means simply the result of
poorly thought through reactions to failing cooperation or
health crises. As noted by Van Assche et al. (2015), innova-
tion originates from successful instances of self-reﬂexive
change and is the direct by-product of governance systems
that create space for learning and experimentation. More
speciﬁcally, knowledge generation and organizational learn-
ing are widely considered to be criteria that are necessary
for adaptive governance to emerge and they are usually
described as a function of social capital (Dietz et al., 2003;
Folke et al., 2005).
Generally speaking, instances of governance innovation in
global health can be mostly grouped into four categories:
(1) creation of new institutions and governance arrange-
ments, such as PPPs, coordination mechanisms, hybrid gov-
ernance coalitions and bilateral initiatives, as a response to
the perceived incoherence and inertia of the UN system
(medium agreement); (2) intra-institutional innovation within
both existing and new institutions to confront path depen-
dencies, donor complacency, competition for funding, shift-
ing priorities of countries, lack of legitimacy and
accountability and sudden health crises (medium agreement);
(3) ideational innovation providing overarching frames, goals
or concepts around which global health actors can coalesce
(medium agreement); and (4) public sector innovation at the
country level fostered by global health actors with the goal
of building capacity and streamlining actions towards more
effective responses (limited agreement). A non-exhaustive set
of examples for these forms of governance innovation,
based on our ﬁndings from interviews and primary texts,
are provided in Table 2.17
While the two trends are not always mutually dependent,
many of the innovations can be linked in different ways to
self-reﬂexive learning processes that are continuously occur-
ring within and across the institutions of global health
governance, including through the career mobility of global
health experts and practitioners. While not exclusive to glo-
bal health, these processes have been particularly intense in
this sector, with epistemic communities – often disease-
based – playing a large role in shaping global health
debates and very active feedbacks loops being created
between epistemic and practice communities (see Hill,
2011). On the one hand, intra-institutional innovation and
creation of new institutions have often been the result of
formal learning processes across our three case studies. This
is shown by, inter alia, the proliferation of high-level com-
missions, review committees and assessment panels that are
now common in the work of the WHO (e.g. the 1989–1992
External Review of the WHO Global Programme on AIDS,
the Commission on the Social Determinants of Health, the
IHR Review Committees codiﬁed in Article 50 of the IHRs,
the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel and more recently the
WHO Independent High-level Commission on NCDs), as well
as in other global health actors (e.g. the UN Secretary-Gen-
eral’s High-level Panel on Access to Medicines; the High-
level Independent Review Panel that provided recommenda-
tions to the GFATM prior to its 2011 governance reform, the
Global Preparedness Monitoring Board unveiled in 2018 by
the WHO and the World Bank Group). On the other hand,
global health governance is more broadly characterized by
constant knowledge creation and network learning at multi-
ple levels, with expert discourses that have been particularly
inﬂuential in the development of shared understandings
and metagovernance norms emphasizing the importance of
inter-organizational convergence and hybrid coalition-build-
ing (see for example, Holzscheiter et al., 2016). A striking
example of such forms of network learning is represented
by the continuity of discourses and approaches provided by
the system of health attaches participating in global health
negotiations in Geneva and beyond, a theme that has
received little attention in the literature but was particularly
evident in the consistence of the responses of the ﬁve
attaches who were interviewed.
That the global health system as a whole appears particu-
larly adaptive does not mean, of course, that all innovations
in global health governance are the results of adaptive gov-
ernance processes. Several interviewees, for example, noted
that windows of opportunity triggered by health crises such
as the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS or the 2014 Ebola outbreak
(limited agreement) played an essential role in bringing the
international community together and prompting gover-
nance reforms (Kickbusch and Reddy, 2015). In turn, these
crises were arguably exacerbated by previous failures in the
translation of learning processes into practice (limited agree-
ment),18 highlighting how different institutions and their
governing bodies can suffer from different degrees of resis-
tance to change and risk-aversion.19 What this indicates is
that learning rarely occurs through technocratic processes
insulated from the politics of global health (see Kickbusch,
2016). As discussed below, political leadership, including
when exercised by private citizens and CSOs, is central to
these dynamics. The perception of what reforms are feasi-
ble, given the political context, plays a fundamental role in
© 2019 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Global Policy (2019)
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the choice of governance instruments,20 and the growing
politicization of health highlights the myriad ways in which
technical expertise and political ideas interact and shape the
evolution of global health governance in the 21st century.
Harnessing the benefits of polycentricity
A second important pathway of change in global health
governance concerns the extent to which institutions, mar-
kets and networks do not operate in isolation, but rather as
part of a highly polycentric governance regime. Polycentric-
ity, as described by, inter alia, Dietz et al. (2003) and Folke
et al. (2005), refers to a multilevel governance system char-
acterized by multiple centres of power that are formally
independent, often redundant in function and connected
through formal and informal networks. Polycentricity is
another key feature of adaptive governance systems, which
some authors have already tried to associate with global
health governance (Tosun, 2018). On the one hand, the
challenges of complexity and interdependence require insti-
tutional diversity, partially overlapping jurisdictions and
functional redundancy in order to buffer against failures and
external shocks. On the other, they also require a set of
shared understandings, goals and norms that can steer
actors and networks towards desired societal outcomes. We
ﬁnd that global health governance exhibits polycentricity in
relation to both of these dimensions, albeit to different
extents.
With respect to the ﬁrst aspect, it is clearly possible to
identify a plurality of centres of power and authority which
go beyond traditional donor countries and conventional
multilateral institutions and which are also increasingly con-
nected with other another through various forms of net-
worked governance (see for example Shiffmanm et al.,
2016), with no particular distinction between case studies.
These centres of power include rising middle income coun-
tries (strong agreement) but also philantropic organizations
capable of exerting inﬂuence and mobilizing signiﬁcant
resources (medium agreement – e.g. BMGF, Rockefeller Foun-
dation, Wellcome Trust), global CSOs and transnational net-
works and movements (strong agreement – e.g. Medecins
sans Frontieres, Treatment Action Campaign, Global Network
of People Living with HIV/AIDS, Antibiotic Resistance Coali-
tion), as well as a broad range of partnerships and coalitions
with different degrees of formalization. As we note in Sec-
tion 2, such a highly polycentric governance system can
possess weaknesses, as it increases transaction costs and
leads to lack of coordination or even conﬂict among actors
(Jordan et al., 2015). Interestingly, polycentricity was not
framed in our interviews as necessarily negative. Rather, sev-
eral interviewees emphasized that the attention to effective-
ness and health outcomes has often overshadowed
considerations of efﬁciency and coherence (strong agree-
ment), contrary to a well-established concern in global
health governance scholarship (Holzscheiter, 2014). In other
words, global health actors seem to have embraced diversity
and redundancy as inevitable, if not ideal, means of provid-
ing global public goods in the 21st century:
You called it a fragmentation. I would call it a
diversiﬁcation, a multiplication of actors [. . .]. A big-
ger world with more players is fantastic. I mean, we
live in such a fantastic era of being able to tackle
big health problems [. . .]. The organizations have
reached the limit of what they can do, [and] the
health problems are getting more complex (Former
WHO senior ofﬁcial 1, 28 November 2016).
From this perspective, two interweaving causal mecha-
nisms stand out. First, polycentricity has meant that
instances of inertia within the WHO or in other parts of the
multilateral system could be partly mitigated by institutional
diversity, as evident from Medecins Sans Frontieres’ leading
role in the ﬁrst response to the 2014 Ebola outbreak (62%
of Ebola interviewees), from the regional coordination efforts
directed by the African Union during the same epidemic
(37.5% of Ebola interviewees), or from the combination of
innovative ﬁnancing mechanisms, bilateral programmes and
philantropic foundations’ engagement that helped scale up
access to HIV/AIDS treatment since the 2000s (80% of HIV/
AIDS interviews). Second, polycentricity is arguably making
global health governance more inclusive, allowing new
voices and perspectives to inﬂuence the agenda of countries
and multilateral institutions, but also the way in which chal-
lenges are framed (strong agreement).21
In relation to the uptake of shared understandings about
what health is and how it ought to be governed, the evi-
dence from our case studies is mixed. On the one hand,
competing discourses have strongly shaped the response to
issues such as HIV/AIDS and the 2014 Ebola outbreak, lead-
ing to instances of lack of trust between different global
health constituencies (50% of Ebola interviews and 20% of
HIV/AIDS interviews), tensions in the choice of solutions
(38% of Ebola interviews),22 and ultimately contributing to a
proliferation of vertical approaches that have often
neglected the dimension of health system strengthening
(50% of Ebola interviews and 40% of HIV/AIDS interviews).
The most glaring case, in this context, is represented by the
persistent failure of country actors to embrace the human
rights-based approach to HIV/AIDS governance that is
enshrined in the work of global health organizations, a
theme which featured prominently in our interviews (70% of
HIV/AIDS interviews). On the other hand, the diffusion of
common narratives, goals and norms within the global
health system is arguably more dynamic than in the past,
ranging from the concepts of universal health coverage
(medium agreement) to the place of Goal 3 on health and
well-being in the SDG framework (limited agreement) (Kick-
busch et al., 2016; Brown and Held, 2017) and including the
emergence of widely accepted metagovernance norms
about the importance of inter-organizational convergence
and stewardship (strong agreement, consistent with
Holzscheiter et al., 2016). More generally, the progressive
uptake of an understanding of health that cannot be
removed from economic, security, environmental and
humanitarian considerations has increased the presence of
health in other policy arenas (and vice versa) and created a
© 2019 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Global Policy (2019)
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fertile ground for the emergence of shared approaches that
takes these interactions into account (medium agreement).
Political leadership
As noted by one of the authors of this article (Kickbusch,
2016, p. 201), the centrality of health to economics and secu-
rity, coupled with its ‘growing role in relation to the legiti-
macy of the state and the values and expectations of citizens’,
has strongly placed health on the agendas of heads of gov-
ernment. Signiﬁcantly, such a trend towards the policitization
of health has not only concerned international political fora
such as the UN Security Council (UNSC), the UNGA, the G8/
G7, the G20 and the BRICS, or the foreign and security policies
of many countries, but there has also been a growing realiza-
tion that all actors engaging in global health governance,
including international organizations, private foundations,
think tanks, CSOs and even experts and scholars, are involved
in processes that are deeply political. As a result, the success-
ful exercise of leadership and political agency is becoming
essential to the construction of legitimacy. Leadership is, in
fact, considered an additional key requirement for adaptive
governance systems, providing key functions including build-
ing trust, linking actors, initiating partnerships and mobilizing
support for change (Chafﬁn et al., 2014; Folke et al., 2005).
Across our case studies, we not only ﬁnd that the path-
ways to overcoming governance challenges can often be
understood in relation to the increased politicization of
health problems, but also that political leadership is fre-
quently a catalyst in the transition of a health issue to the
highest level of politics, a notion that was already vocally
supported at the turn of the century by former WHO DG Gro
Harlem Bruntland (Brundtland, 2001; WHO, 1998). From this
perspective, politicization and political leadership are increas-
ingly considered to be prerequisites for overcoming
instances of gridlock in global health governance, particularly
by: (1) catalysing tipping points in which the international
community is able to come together in support of gover-
nance innovations (medium agreement); (2) sustaining politi-
cal momentum in the face of competing priorities, shifting
agendas and donor fatigue (medium agreement); and (3)
shining a light on neglected dimensions of health crises and
bringing attention to marginalized groups, power imbalances
and injustices (limited agreement). Table 3 below summarizes
the most common references to such instances of politiciza-
tion and exercise of political leadership in our case studies.
What are the implications for global health governance of
such a seismic shift away from the traditional understanding
that political decision-making and technical expertise could
(and should) be insulated from one another? Our ﬁndings
suggest three important considerations. First, as noted
above, political leadership is a concept that does not apply
to countries and heads of government alone. Multilateral
institutions and their senior management have in many
cases played a driving role in the transition of health
challenges to high-politics and so have NGOs, CSOs, phi-
lantrophic foundations and even high-proﬁle experts, practi-
tioners and advocates (consistent with Fidler, 2010;
Kickbusch, 2015; and Lencucha et al., 2010). Second, political
leadership, as well as the purpose of its exercise (e.g. chan-
neling funding, pushing for accountability, supporting gover-
nance innovations, raising momentum beyond the health
sector), are inevitably shaped by the different interests of
leaders (Brown and Held, 2017; National Academies of
Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, 2017; Wang and Sun,
2014), thus emphasizing the importance of plurality and
inclusiveness in the global health debates and negotiations
of the 21st century. Finally and perhaps most importantly,
the growing importance of political leadership in a polycen-
tric global health system appears to be associated with
renewed expectations of the stewardship function of the
WHO as the world’s main arena for convening, priority-set-
ting, negotiation and rule-making on health matters (med-
ium agreement, a ﬁnding that is consistent with Frenk and
Moon, 2013). As solutions to health challenges become both
multifaceted and multisectoral, the WHO is increasingly
asked to direct, coordinate and galvanize the global health
community (Van Belle et al., 2017), including by strengthen-
ing its ability to position health interests within the wider
global political landscape. While skepticism was expressed
by several interviewees (limited agreement) as to WHO’s
effective capacity to do so, interestingly this appears to be
the way in which the organization’s new DG has decided to
interpret his mandate:
I know from my own experience in politics that
with buy-in from the highest levels, anything is
possible. Without it, progress is difﬁcult. That is
why I have made a priority of engaging with lead-
ers all over the world, to advocate for political
action on health (Address by Dr Tedros Adhanom
Ghebreyesus at the WHO’s 71st World Health
Assembly, 21 May 2018).
In addition, a recent initiative by the heads of govern-
ment of three countries – Germany, Norway and Ghana –
has led to the cooperation of 11 global health institutions
(coordinated by the WHO) in the development of the Global
Action Plan for Health and Well-being for All, a joint action
plan for the implementation of SDG3.23 The framework for
the plan was ultimately launched in October 2018 at the
World Health Summit in Berlin.24
4. Conclusion
This article has shown that the last three decades have
brought a remarkable degree of innovation in global health
governance within a wider geopolitical context characterized
by increasing complexity and interdependence. More speciﬁ-
cally, we have argued that these developments were made
possible by two interrelated conditions. First, dynamics that
are usually associated with gridlock and stalemate in multi-
lateral cooperation, such as institutional fragmentation and
growing multipolarity, have effectively transformed, rather
than gridlocked, global health governance, changing the
structural context in which the rules are formed and the
solutions deployed and, in some cases, providing an
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impetus for meaningful governance innovations. Second,
global health actors have often been able to harness the
opportunities offered by three important pathways of
change, namely: (1) the existence of a signiﬁcant degree of
organizational learning and active feedback loops between
epistemic and practice communities; (2) a highly polycentric
system of governance, whereby the formation of hybrid
coalitions, the establishment of new bodies and pro-
grammes and the creation of more effective coordinating
mechanisms can act as mitigating factors against the risks
of institutional inertia; and (3) the increased role of political
leadership as a catalyst for governance innovation. Overall,
these ﬁndings are consistent with the key argument, raised
in Beyond Gridlock by Hale et al. (2017), that widespread
gridlock conditions in the multilateral order have not pre-
vented signiﬁcant innovations from emerging in many sec-
tors, including global health governance, that have faced
counteracting casual mechanisms ‘through’ or ‘beyond’
gridlock.
How far these innovations imply effective change in terms
of health risks or outcomes remains to be seen and should
be the subject of further research. What is certain, however,
is that contrary to a notable strand of literature which
laments the lack of successful institutional innovation and
networked governance solutions in global health
governance (Fidler, 2010; Lee, 2017; Smith and Lee, 2017),
such mechanisms have been experienced and supported by
the interviewees and are observable across the three case
studies. In fact, the governance trajectories of HIV/AIDS,
Ebola and AMR bear great signiﬁcance in terms of the emer-
gence of the adaptive features of global health governance
discussed in this article. As the disease which effectively ‘in-
vented global health’ (Brandt, 2013), the HIV/AIDS case
study demonstrated the catalytic function of political leader-
ship in both donor and affected countries, as well as the
importance of polycentric systems of governance in which
civil society, non-state actors and emerging powers are all
able to mobilize commitments and encourage the adoption
of innovative governance arrangements. The humanitarian
and health security crises triggered by the 2014 Ebola out-
break underlined the urgency of global health actors and
world leaders investing more political capital in support of
governance innovation for infectious diseases, whereas the
subsequent reform process illustrated how the outcomes of
learning dynamics in global health governance can ulti-
mately determine the success or failure of international
responses to health challenges. Lastly, the rising threat of
AMR has shed further light on the urgency of bringing
diverse coalitions of health and non-health actors together
under common goals and norms, coupled with another
Table 3. Milestones in the transition to high-level politics and main actors involved in the exercise of political leadership for each of the
three case studies, based on the responses received during the qualitative interviews.
Case
Study
Instances of politicisation (i.e. transition to
high-level politics) Main instances of political leadership
HIV/AIDS • Adoption of the MDGs (2000)
• UNSC Resolution 1308 (17 July 2000) and 1983 (7 June
2011)
• UNGA Special Session on HIV/AIDS (25–27 June 2001)
• Abuja Declaration on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Other
Related Infectious Diseases (27 April 2001) and
• High-level meeting on AIDS (8–10 June 2011)
• High-level meeting on ending AIDS (8–10 June 2016)
• UNAIDS’ ﬁve-year strategies (2011–2015 and 2016–2021)
to eradicate AIDS
• IOs: UNAIDS, World Bank
• Countries: United States and donor countries in the
West, Brazil, Thailand, South Africa (after Thabo Mbeki
presidency), India
• Philantropic foundations: BMGF, Clinton Foundation, Ford
Foundation
• NGOs and Civil society: GNP+, TAC, International AIDS
Society etc.
• Individuals: Jonathan Mann, Peter Piot, Koﬁ Annan, Fes-
tus Mogae, Yoweri Museweni, Olusegun Obasanjo,
George W. Bush, Jacques Chirac, Michel Sidibe etc.
Ebola • Announcement of Ebola as a Public Health Emergency
of International Concern (8 August 2014)
• UNSC Resolution 2177(2014) (15 September 2014)
• High-level Meeting on Ebola Response (23 September
2014) and UNGA Resolution 69/1 (19 September 2014)
• G7 Germany 2015 and Foreign Ministers’ declaration
‘Beyond Ebola: a G7 agenda to help prevent future
crises and enhance security in Africa (15 April 2015)
• Continued engagement in 2016 and 2017 at the G20
• NGOs: Medecins Sans Frontieres
• Regional organizations: African Union, ECOWAS, Mano
River Union
• Countries: South Africa, United States, Germany, Ghana,
Norway, the affected countries
• Individuals: David Nabarro, Bruce Aylward, Margaret
Chan, Joanne Liu
AMR • Adoption of the WHO Global Action Plan on AMR (May
2015)
• High-level Meeting on AMR (21 September 2016)
• AMR as a priority for G7 (2015 Berlin Declaration on
AMR, 2016 Ise-Shima Vision for Global Health) and G20
(at G20 Germany 2017)
• IOs: World Health Organisation
• Countries: Germany, Japan, Sweden, Denmark, Nether-
lands, United Kingdom
• Civil society: Antibiotic Resistance Coalition (ARC), ReAct
• Individuals: Sally Davies, Jim O’Neill, Margaret Chan
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demonstration that the transition of a health issue to the
highest level of politics can serve as a tipping point for col-
lective action.
The processes exempliﬁed in the three case studies have
arguably played a central role in the expansion and politi-
cization of global health in the face of developments push-
ing in the opposite direction (e.g. increasingly fragmented
global health development aid, pressure exercised by mem-
ber states on the WHO, competition from other global chal-
lenges). It should be noted that these trends risk
accelerating in the new era of multilevel and multiactor glo-
bal health governance, due to the rising health impacts
associated with an increasingly globalized economy (e.g.
facilitated spread of infectious diseases, trade in processed
foods and substandard medicines), rapid demographic
changes leading to a shifting burden of disease in many
countries and growing awareness of the causes of ill health
originating in other areas of global governance such as the
environment, trade, intellectual property and investment.
This is why, notwithstanding the signiﬁcant developments
analyzed in this article, our ﬁndings also acknowledge that
major uncertainties remain.
We arguably stand at the onset of a ‘new world health era’
(Pablos-Mendez and Raviglione, 2018) characterized not by
linear trends towards gridlock or health improvements, but
rather by abrupt changes and growing insecurities. First, the
fact that pathways to gridlock in global health governance
have often yielded opportunities for governance innovations
and adaptations does not mean that they have not also
caused challenges in the response to the three health threats
discussed here. In addition to what has been noted in Sec-
tion 2 for growing multipolarity and fragmentation, instances
of institutional inertia within the WHO are still seen as major
obstacles for effective global health governance (Kickbusch
and Reddy, 2015; Schaferhoff et al., 2015), while at the same
time the combined impacts of rapid demographic, environ-
mental, economic, social and technological changes will argu-
ably continue to make health-related problems harder in the
future (OECD 2016; Whitmee et al., 2015; WHO 2018). Second,
many of our interviewees emphasized the importance of
pathways that are only partially captured by gridlock theory,
particularly in terms of: (1) ensuring a smooth but effective
transition from DAH to greater country ownership and mobi-
lization of domestic ﬁnance for health; and (2) continuing the
shift away from vertical, disease-speciﬁc governance to an
approach focused on UHC and global public goods.
From this perspective, the processes of adaptation and
innovation highlighted in this article might be entering a
new phase, in which their limits are further stretched and
called into question. First, continuing governance innovation
among traditional global health actors and networks will not,
in itself, be able to deal with increasingly complex multisec-
toral challenges (e.g. AMR, NCDs, climate change) which
require systemic changes beyond the health sector. As shown
by the case of AMR, for example, the engagement of non-
health actors is often seen as being in its infancy and the
results of calls for integration made at high-level political fora
such as the G7, G20 and UNGA are yet to be explored.
Second, for the global health system to be able to exercise its
stewardship function on emerging health issues, efforts at
generating buy-in by country actors will have to be comple-
mented by a stronger emphasis on using political leadership
to create ownership at the domestic level, ﬁlling the persis-
tent implementation and capacity gap that many countries
still face (e.g. pushing for the effective implementation of the
IHRs in vulnerable countries, promoting domestic legislation
on prudent use of antibiotics, advocating for sustainable
health systems). Finally, the clear emergence of trends
towards greater inclusiveness of governance processes and
diffusion of shared goals and norms will have to be evaluated
against the parallel rise of new nationalist tendencies, the
perceived retreat of liberalism and a rapidly shifting distribu-
tion of powers. Three years after the adoption of the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development, not only does the multi-
lateral context appear dramatically different, it will arguably
continue to undergo phases of major disruption and inter-
connected crisis, putting global health governance’s adaptive
capacity to its most challenging test yet.
Notes
This article represents the main output of the “How to Break the Gridlock
in Global Health Governance” research project (2015-2018), hosted by
the Global Health Centre at the Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies. The project has received funding from the Swiss
network for International Studies (SNIS) under its Call for Projects 2015.
1. Global health governance has been broadly deﬁned as ‘the use of
formal and informal institutions, rules and processes by states, inter-
governmental organizations and nonstate actors to deal with chal-
lenges to health that require cross-border collective action’ (Fidler,
2010). Within this wider space, Kickbusch and Cassar Szabo (2014)
use the notion of ‘global health governance’ in a more restrictive
sense, referring to those institutions and process of global gover-
nance that have an explicit health mandate.
2. Bourgeois (2018) recently described the idea of governance innova-
tion as the ‘continuous search for new paradigms to [. . .] achieve
better policy decisions in an era characterized by complexity and a
holistic understanding of well-being’. Throughout this article, by
‘governance innovation’ we will speciﬁcally refer to both intra-insti-
tutional innovations and what Moore and Hartley (2008: 4–5) deﬁne
as ‘innovations in governance’, that is, innovations that occur above
the organizational level and ‘involve networks of organizations,
or the transformation of complex social production systems’.
3. The ﬁnal number is 41, because one interviewee was interviewed
about his direct involvement with both the governance of the 2014
Ebola outbreak and that of AMR.
4. In fact, it could be argued that state inﬂuence, which has itself been
an original driver of fragmentation in global health governance, is
becoming stronger as such fragmentation intensiﬁes, giving a dis-
proportionate voice over certain health issues to the countries that
have contributed the most resources towards the related response.
5. This is shown, inter alia, by the 2016 agreement on the WHO
Framework of Engagement with Non-State Actors (FENSA), which
represented an unprecedented effort by a multilateral institution to
detail the modalities of engagement with the growing plethora of
civil society organizations, foundations, private companies and aca-
demic institutions in the global health space.
6. References to growing multipolarity in the context of the 2014 Ebola
outbreak did not concern the governance of the Ebola response itself.
Rather, they mostly focused on the inﬂuence of rising middle income
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countries (e.g. Brazil, India, Russia) in the post-Ebola reform process
and particularly on their skepticism towards the relationship between
the WHO and the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) in the con-
text of the joint external evaluation of the International Health Regu-
lations (IHRs) core capacities (37.5% of the Ebola interviews).
7. One project that was speciﬁcally mentioned was Thailand’s Antibi-
otic Smart Use project, in the interview with the senior representa-
tive of an international NGO 2 (15 March 2017). See also ReAct’s
case study on Antibiotic Smart Use: https://www.reactgroup.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/Antibiotic-Smart-Use-project-case-study.pdf
(accessed 22 June 2018).
8. Examples include the joint venture set up in 2005 between Indian
pharmaceutical company Cipla, Quality Chemicals limited and the
Government of Uganda; Ghana’s Danadams, a joint venture
between Adams Pharmaceuticals (a Chinese company) and Dan-
pong Pharmaceuticals; and the cooperation between Brazil and
Mozambique on the construction of the African country’s ﬁrst ARV
factory under the two governments’ Protocolo de Intencoes on inter-
national technical cooperation in health.
9. Senior advisor for an international health organization (13 March
2017); senior representative of an international NGO 3 (12 March 2017).
10. See for example Godlee (1997) and Szlezak (2012).
11. Already in 1987, the UN Department of International Economic and
Social Affairs created a Steering Committee on AIDS which included
agencies and programme tasked with responding to different
aspects of the epidemic, such as UNICEF, the UN Population Fund
(UNPFA), the UN Development Programme and WHO. The WHO
Global Programme on AIDS (GPA) and the WHO/UNDP Alliance to
Combat AIDS were also set up in the same year.
12. On HIV/AIDS, 20% of the interviewees for example pointed to the
confusion created at the country level about the different priorities,
accountability mechanisms and reporting requirements of the insti-
tutions disbursing funding in the affected countries, especially
before the 2003 launch of the Three Ones Principles, the 2011
UNAIDS Strategic Investment Framework and the 2014 partnership
agreement between the WHO and the GFATM.
13. On AMR, for example, one interviewee referred to the common dis-
crepancies and mistrust that exists among institutions focusing on
AMR data gathering and surveillance (director of a research organi-
zation 1, 25 March 2017), while another lamented the risk of ‘sepa-
rate tracks’ being created between AMR stewardship and R&D on
new antimicrobials, with ‘the former remaining under the WHO
through the Global Action Plan and the latter becoming part of
member-state-driven funding mechanisms or PDPs’ (director of a
research organization 2, 20 January 2017).
14. Medium agreement across all interviews.
15. On HIV/AIDS, according to one interviewee, ‘programmes like the
GFATM or the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)
became vast programmes that do not easily take directions from
other organizations’ (former WHO senior ofﬁcial 1, 6 January 2017).
16. On AMR, such common goals and norms are for example repre-
sented by the endorsement, on the part of UNGA, G7 and G20, of a
one health approach to AMR and of the WHO Global Action Plan; in
the Ebola response and aftermath, they consisted in, inter alia, the
support to developing countries in the implementation of the Inter-
national Health Regulations (IHRs) and to the reform of the WHO
emergency work. More generally, there is evidence that universal
health coverage (UHC) and the SDGs have also become ‘master
concepts and norms’ adopted by the key institutions and venues
for global health (Brown and Held, 2017).
17. It should be noted that more recent governance innovations, includ-
ing the Global Preparedness Monitoring Board jointly created by the
WHO and the World Bank, are not included in the Table because
they were created after the interview phase for this article was con-
cluded. This, in itself, highlights the extremely dynamic and con-
stantly changing nature of global health governance.
18. With respect to Ebola, for example, 50% of the interviewees pointed
to the failure, on the part of the WHO, to implement the recom-
mendations of the IHR Review Committee set up after the H1N1
inﬂuenza outbreak of 2009 as one of the main reasons behind the
organization’s lack of capacity and preparedness during the 2014
outbreak.
19. The nature of WHO as a member-state organization was frequently
brought up by the interviewees as the main limiting factor prevent-
ing it from implementing lessons drawn from learning processes.
However, even institutions that have been created in response to
the perceived inertia of the WHO, including GAVI, UNAIDS and the
GFATM, have been described in the interviews as not immune from
the same risks (medium agreement).
20. For example, the creation of new institutions vis-a-vis the establish-
ment of coordination mechanisms, or the negotiations of binding
legal instruments as opposed to political strategies or action plans.
21. This is the case, mentioned above, of the critical role played by
mass-scale movements in the Global South in bringing the issue of
access to treatment to the fore of the HIV/AIDS response; of the
presence (and inﬂuence) of civil society in the governing boards of
institutions such as UNAIDS and the GFATM; and of the increasing
dialogue between WHO and consumer groups advocating for a
stronger response to antibiotic use in agriculture and husbandry.
22. These interviewees have for example referred to the health security
framing of the Ebola epidemic and how it might have eroded trust
in local communities and led countries to take decisions that were
ultimately negative for an effective response, such as refusing to
share medicine stockpiles or restricting travel from the affected
countries.
23. The original letter calling for the Action Plan, addressed to Dr
Tedros Adhanom by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Ghanaian
President Nana Kufo-Addo and Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Sol-
berg, is available from: https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/
DE/_Anlagen/2018/04/2018-04-19-brief-who-englisch.pdf;jsessionid=
5F7A69A3EB21994778144B354C2826C6.s5t1?__blob=publicationFil
e&v=1 (accessed 17 September 2018).
24. See for example: http://health.bmz.de/events/Events_2018/report
ing_from_world_health_summit_2018/global_action_plan/index.html
(accessed 2 November 2018).
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